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to more than the emissions reduction 
from the voluntary commitments of the 
developed nations.
Divisions in Developing World
But a significant weakness of the position 
of the BASIC four (Brazil, South Africa, In-
dia and China) at Copenhagen is that 
from the point of view of the small devel-
oping nations at the forefront of climate 
change as well as the small island nations 
the question of who bears the brunt of 
emissions cuts may seem moot, especially 
since global warming threatens their very 
existence. At the summit, the developed 
countries led by the United States suc-
ceeded in driving a wedge between the 
major developing economies and the rest 
of the G-77, counterposing the develop-
ment needs of a major part of the world’s 
population with the vulnerability of the 
small nations at the forefront of global 
warming impacts. 
While fighting for their justified share 
of carbon space, it is clear that the major 
developing economies need to acknowl-
edge that they have greater responsibili-
ties as distinct from the rest of G-77 to 
avoid being trapped by the developed 
countries. At the same time, any attempt 
by the smaller developing nations to capi-
talise on this division between the devel-
oped nations and the major developing 
nations, would legitimise the current tac-
tics of the global North that undermines 
the very global environmental gover-
nance that is critical to their ability to face 
up to the climate crisis. But both sections 
collectively need to evolve an arrange-
ment that guarantees a relatively fair 
share of the global carbon space within a 
reasonably tight carbon budge.
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Regulating Microfinance:  
A Suggested Framework
Savita Shankar, Mukul G Asher
It is time to address regulatory 
issues to enable the microfinance 
sector to contribute more 
effectively to the goal of financial 
inclusion, and to provide an 
environment in which all 
stakeholders can participate  
with confidence. 
India with a population of around 300 million poor people has emerged as a large potential market for the micro-
finance sector, which is attracting funding 
from various sources. To enable the coun-
try to leverage this interest and use it to 
progress towards the goal of financial in-
clusion, it is important to develop a regu-
latory structure for the sector, for a 
number of reasons. First, regulation is 
needed to enable microfinance institu-
tions (MFIs) to offer savings services, the 
lack of which is a major shortcoming of 
the sector. Second, with the entry of 
c ommercially-oriented participants, the 
need for supervision and consumer 
 protection is even more pressing. Third, 
with MFIs broadening their range of serv-
ices to include services such as insurance 
and pension products, coordinated regu-
lation of the sector is required. Finally, 
given the diversity of legal forms of MFIs, 
a uniform regulatory framework would 
enable a l evel playing field and prevent 
regulatory arbitrage. 
Challenges of Regulation
The lending models used in microfinance 
have peculiarities and hence its regulation 
poses certain unique challenges. 
First, MFIs may not pose systemic chal-
lenges in the sense that it is unlikely that 
even the largest MFIs are “too big to fail”. 
They however deal with low-income 
groups least likely to be able to bear down-
side risks. Hence in a democratic country, 
politically MFIs may be “too sensitive to 
fail”. The implicit contingent liabilities are 
on the State, making their effective regu-
lation in the interest of the government.
Second, while banks usually have to 
make full provisions for loans without col-
lateral, such a measure is not possible in the 
case of MFIs, as most of their loans are col-
lateral free. On-time repayments on micro-
finance loans, however, tend to be high, 
though experience shows that once a loan is 
overdue, the ultimate collection of the loan 
is less likely, than in the case of loans that 
are backed by collateral (Rosenberg 2008). 
As a result, provisioning a lready delinquent 
loans needs to be more aggressive for mi-
crocredit loans as compared to other loans. 
Third, while bank failures may be con-
tagious due to the interdependent nature 
of the payments system, the interdepend-
encies between group members in micro-
finance can lead to a different kind of con-
tagion effect. Widespread defaults can 
o ccur either if some members start con-
sistently defaulting or if there are rumours 
of MFI failures. An important incentive for 
repayment of collateral free MFI loans is 
the ability to obtain larger loans in the 
f uture. Any event which makes the possi-
bility of future loans reduce considerably, 
has the potential to trigger widespread 
d efaults. A regulator of MFIs therefore has 
to be highly sensitive to these realities. 
Fourth, MFI customers are often first 
time users of financial services and  usua lly 
have low education. The responsibility on 
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the MFI to offer the right products which 
suit their members’ needs as well as pro-
vide adequate financial education and 
training to them is considerable. Regula-
tion needs to necessarily oversee this im-
portant element of MFI operations.
Fifth, merely formulating regulation re-
garding codes of conduct for MFIs and pro-
viding channels for dispute resolution re-
garding MFI practices is not sufficient. 
Moreover, the channels need to be easily 
accessible and MFI customers need to be 
made aware of them.
Sixth, the cost that MFIs would incur in 
complying with regulation needs to be 
considered, as it may have an impact on 
their lending rates. 
Regulation of any financial institution, 
including an MFI, needs to encompass pru-
dential and non-prudential issues. The 
first relates to issues regarding solvency of 
the institution, important to maintain 
confidence in the financial system and 
protect depositors. The second includes all 
other matters such as guidelines on 
i nterest rates, truth-in-lending laws and 
anti money laundering rules. 
The Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor’s (CGAP)1 guidelines on microfinance 
regulation favour a clear distinction be-
tween the supervision of depository (d eposit 
accepting) and non-depository MFIs, as 
the former require closer monitoring. 
Housing the supervision of non-depository 
MFIs separately helps avoid confusion 
r egarding which MFIs are being monitored 
closely. The guidelines suggest that 
d eposit-taking MFIs should be supervised 
by the authority which supervises com-
mercial banks, so as to leverage existing 
supervisory skills and reduce incentive for 
regulatory arbitrage. The supervisory staff 
needs however to be trained in the partic-
ular portfolio characteristics of MFIs. 
Prudential Issues
These include minimum capital limits, 
capital adequacy requirements and loan 
loss provisions. A minimum capital limit is 
usually set which is often used as a 
r ationing device in order to keep the 
number of MFIs to be supervised within 
manageable limits (Rosenberg 2008). 
Capital ade quacy requirements are based 
on the premise that capital acts as a cush-
ion against p ossible losses for depositors 
and creditors. Similarly, loan loss provi-
sions are required so as to build reserves 
to p rovide for future losses. The peculiari-
ties of MFI portfolios discussed earlier 
need to be t aken into account while set-
ting these requirements. 
Non-Prudential Issues
Regulation encouraging transparent dis-
closure of interest rates, offering appro-
priate financial products, fair selling practi-
ces and methods for collecting loans come 
under non-prudential regulation of MFIs. 
Often interest rate caps are also sug-
gested as interest rates in microfinance 
are observed to be higher than in the case 
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of most other loans. Transaction costs aris-
ing from doorstep delivery of the loan, 
when computed as a percentage of the 
small loan size do contribute to the high 
rates charged. Capping the interest rate 
can lead to undesirable outcomes such as 
exclusion of needy customers whose pro-
files call for interest rates in excess of the 
cap. Moreover, a uniform interest rate cap 
could create incentives for MFIs to stay 
away from difficult and new geographies, 
where transaction costs are higher. Deter-
mining and enforcing appropriate interest 
rate caps could also be difficult as finan-
cial products are inherently complex. 
There is a possibility that MFIs may be 
e ncouraged to repackage loan contracts 
by varying repayment schedules, fees and 
other aspects such that effective interest 
rates remain the same. 
One of the most important non-pruden-
tial issues is transparent disclosure of in-
terest rates. Often, interest rates charged 
by MFIs involve upfront fees and service 
charges, making calculation of effective 
interest rates complex. Moreover, some-
times rates are calculated on a flat basis 
and not on a diminishing balance basis. 
Such practices are also observed in India. 
A study by Porteous (2006) of mature 
m icrofinance markets highlighted the im-
portance of requiring MFIs to quote inter-
est rates in a uniform manner in contrib-
uting to reduction of rates over time. Non- 
prudential microfinance regulation in 
I ndia needs to address this issue. 
Proposed Model for Regulation
It is only recently that most countries have 
started seriously addressing microfinance 
regulation. Hence, the possibility of learn-
ing from the experience of other countries 
is limited. 
The policy with regard to microfinance 
in India has been largely positive and de-
velopmental and at the same time marked 
by caution and prudence. While the policy 
has brought the sector to its current state 
of development, in order to enable the 
s ector to grow further in an orderly man-
ner, certain major policy initiatives need 
to be taken. 
The most important missing link in the 
country’s financial inclusion efforts is that 
of adequate saving channels for the poor. 
While commercial banks, regional rural 
banks and post offices, have good geo-
graphical networks, they are often unable 
to provide the doorstep collection of small 
deposits on a regular, frequent basis as re-
quired by the low income groups. These 
groups are usually unable to visit formal 
financial institutions during specified 
working hours without incurring consid-
erable transaction costs in terms of time 
and money. MFI operations on the other 
hand are tailored to more effectively meet 
their requirements and hence they should 
be permitted to provide savings services. 
While the “business correspondent” m odel 
attempts to increases savings avenues for 
the poor, large MFIs which have the scale 
required to provide these services in an 
economic manner, have not been ade-
quately incentivised to participate in it. 
The other important missing link in the 
country is that of affordable remittance 
and payments services. Mobile banking 
provides the greatest scope for this to take 
place. In Philippines, a typical transaction 
through a bank branch which costs $2.50 is 
estimated to cost only $0.50 when auto-
mated using a mobile phone (Asian Banker 
2007). In Kenya, the success of M-PESA, the 
mobile money scheme launched by 
S afaricom, its largest mobile operator has 
nearly 7 million users out of a total popula-
tion of 38 million (The Economist 2009). 
The benefits for customers include quicker 
and cheaper transfer of money and a 
means to save small amounts of money for 
emergencies. The huge customer base and 
p owerful brand of the mobile company 
enabled outreach to unbanked segments 
of the population. As regulators in many 
countries do not permit non-bank entities 
to offer banking services, other models 
have developed. For example, in Uganda, 
a leading mobile company has partnered 
with a bank to offer a similar service 
(The Economist 2009). 
It is proposed that to address these two 
missing links, some of the large MFIs 
should be selectively permitted to be 
c onverted to a special category of MFI 
banks with lower initial capital require-
ments. These MFI banks should be permi-
tted to offer savings as well as mobile 
p ayment services. 
Given the large geographic area of the 
country, licences to collect deposits need 
to be provided selectively to entities, so as 
to enable effective regulation. Regulators 
should assess an MFI thoroughly based on 
financial, management and operational 
criteria. These entities should also have 
the capability to increase outreach sub-
stantially and reap economies of scale and 
scope, with the potential to lower costs of 
microfinance services. Large MFIs who 
have a satisfactory track record are possi-
ble likely candidates. After a licence is pro-
vided, continued supervision and moni-
toring of these entities is called for.
It may be desirable to extend deposit in-
surance to MFI bank depositors, though it 
may also create moral hazard issues. In 
any case, the contingent liability of the 
savings collected is likely to be on the 
State given India’s political economy char-
acteristics, making their regulation im-
portant for the government. 
Permitting MFI banks to partner with 
mobile companies to offer mobile bank-
ing services has the potential to enable 
access to remittance services to a large 
number of unbanked customers. While 
the banks have a relationship with these 
customers and are best placed to service 
them, the mobile companies have the 
technology and expertise required. Such 
collaborations can bring down transaction 
costs considerably. 
The creation of MFI banks amounts to 
allowing entry to private well-governed 
deposit-taking small banks as recom-
mended by the Raghuram Rajan Commit-
tee on Financial Sector Reforms (2008). 
As suggested by the committee, these 
banks will be in closer touch with custom-
ers and will provide tailor made products 
and services to them. 
As small banks tend to be geographi-
cally focused, the Rajan Committee sug-
gests offsetting their higher risk by im-
posing on them more stringent regula-
tions. Higher capital adequacy norms, 
stricter prohibition on related party 
transactions and lower allowable single 
party transactions have been suggested. 
While the last of the three may not be 
 applicable in the case of MFIs which 
 usually have large number of small 
 borrowers, the first two suggestions 
should be considered in deve loping 
 regulatory norms for MFI banks. As 
 recommended by the com mittee, the 
s upervisory capacity should be developed 
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to deliver the greater  monitoring these 
n ewer banks will require. 
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) would 
be an appropriate choice for prudential 
regulation of MFI banks, as it is the regula-
tor for banks in India. This may stretch the 
regulatory capacity of RBI but would 
n evertheless be a worthwhile investment 
for the country as in the long run it could 
result in large-scale financial inclusion 
and financial deepening. Training a team 
of officials at RBI on various microfinance 
models and the peculiarities of microfi-
nance regulation as well as the intricacies 
of prudential regulation will be required.  
The non-prudential regulation of MFIs 
may be carried out by an independent reg-
ulator in the nature of an oversight board 
(OB) reporting to the RBI, so as to not to 
overstretch the regulatory capacity of RBI. 
The board should be broad-based in 
n ature consisting of representatives from 
government, banks, MFIs, SHG federations, 
Sa-Dhan, NGOs and consumer forums.
MFIs of all legal forms should be required 
to register themselves with this regulator 
and adhere to the uniform code of conduct 
prescribed. The code should cover truth in 
lending, transparency with regard to 
charges, financial education, selling appro-
priate financial products, practices for 
monitoring and collection as well as norms 
for provisioning of loans.Channels for cus-
tomer complaints and dispute resolution 
should also be provided and creative com-
munication should be used to explain their 
availability to SHG and MFI members. 
The OB should coordinate with other 
 financial sector regulators, for instance, 
with IRDA and PFRDA, with regard to in-
surance and pension services. The mem-
bers of the OB should have the requisite 
expertise as a group and access to public 
and private sector experts. This can be ac-
complished through appropriate advisory 
committees. The above recommendations 
effectively amount to having two regula-
tors. For prudential supervision of MFI 
banks, regulation by RBI is proposed. For 
non-prudential supervision for the sector 
as a whole, an independent OB reporting 
to the RBI is suggested. 
The creation of regulatory capacity for 
prudential and non-prudential regula-
tion of the Indian microfinance sector 
will be a major challenge, but is likely 
to be a worthwhile investment for the 
c ountry as in the long run, it could result 
in large-scale fi nan cial inclusion and 
fi nancial deepening. 
Note
1  The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor is an 
international consortium of public and private 
d evelopment agencies. 
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